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People v. Kagan and New York Banking
Law Section 673: A Study in
Misapplication
I. Introduction
Section 673 of the New York Banking Law,' which criminal-
izes the wilful misapplication of bank funds by officers or em-
ployees, recently received some much-needed clarification in the
case of People v. Kagan. The New York Court of Appeals, in
dismissing felony indictments based on that statute, held that,
absent fraudulent intent or self-dealing, the infraction of civil
banking regulations does not constitute a crime.' The decision,
vindicating three former officers of the now defunct American
Bank & Trust Company (ABT), delimits the scope of what is
meant by "wilful misapplication," a term left undefined by the
Banking Law, and thereby reduces the risk of criminal prosecu-
tion for New York bankers who err in the ordinary course of
business.
This note considers the legislative history of the mens rea
and transactional requirements of section 673 and the rather
limited prior case law interpreting the statute. After analyzing
the Kagan decision in light of this background, this note con-
cludes that the result reached in Kagan brings New York's mis-
applicaton statute into closer conformity with its federal coun-
1. Section 673 of the Banking Law provides:
Any officer, director, trustee, employee or agent of any corporation to which the
banking law is applicable, or any employee or agent of any private banker, who
abstracts or wilfully misapplies any of the money, funds or property of such corpo-
ration or private banker, or wilfully misapplies its or his credit, is guilty of a fel-
ony. Nothing in this section shall be deemed or construed to repeal, amend or
impair any existing provision of law prescribing a punishment for any such
offense.
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 673 (McKinney 1971).
2. 56 N.Y.2d 193, 436 N.E.2d 1274, 451 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1982).
3. Id. at 204, 436 N.E.2d at 1278, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 676. The civil regulations in ques-
tion, §§ 103(1), 103(8), and 106 of the Banking Law, are described more fully infra at
note 9.
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terpart,' consequently restricting section 673's applicability to
the type of criminal conduct envisioned by its drafters.
II. Background
A. The Facts
In the years 1975-76, ABT was acquired by the Graivers, a
prominent Argentinian banking family.5 During this period,
ABT engaged in a variety of transactions whereby money was
loaned to and deposited with several other financial institutions
controlled by the Graivers.' None of the questioned transactions
resulted in any loss to ABT or any gain to the defendants, who
served there in executive and management positions.' A number
of the transactions, however, exceeded the limits imposed by
sections 103(1), 103(8), and 106 of New York's Banking Law,
regulating bank loans and transfers.9 On the basis of these viola-
4. The federal misapplication statute states, in pertinent part:
Whoever being an officer, director, agent or employee of . . [a nationally
chartered bank] . . . embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of.
the moneys, funds or credits of such bank or any moneys, funds, assets or securi-
ties intrusted to the custody or care of such bank. .. (shall be guilty of a felony].
18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
5. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d at 201, 436 N.E.2d at 1276, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
6. The transactions consisted of "time deposits, the purchase of foreign checks,
overdrafts, grants of immediate credit on domestic checks, and sales of federal funds."
People v. Kagan, 83 A.D.2d 517, 519, 441 N.Y.S.2d 256, 259 (1st Dep't 1981) (Kupfer-
man, J., dissenting) (mem.).
7. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d at 202, 436 N.E.2d at 1277, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
8. The defendants included the chairman of the board of ABT's holding company,
who also served as an executive officer and director of ABT; a senior manager who
headed ABT's international division; and a director of both ABT and its holding com-
pany. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d at 200-01, 436 N.E.2d at 1276, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
David Graiver, as owner of the bank and the prime mover behind the transactions in
question was unavailable for trial, having been presumed killed in a plane crash over
Mexico in August 1976. People v. Kagan, 83 A.D.2d at 519, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Kup.
ferman, J., dissenting).
9. Section 103(1) limits the amount that a bank may loan to a single borrower to
10% of its capital stock, surplus fund, and undivided profits, N.Y. BANKING LAW § 103(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1982), allowing a 25% limit if the loan is secured, N.Y. BANKING LAW §
103(1)(c) (McKinney 1971).
Section 103(8) limits the amount that can be loaned to a director or director-con-
trolled entity by requiring approval of the board of directors of the lending bank. Id. §
103(8).
Section 106 limits the amount that one bank may deposit with a depositary bank to
10% of the depositing bank's capital stock, surplus funds, and undivided profits. Up to
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tions, two of the bank's officers were tried by a jury and con-
victed of felonious misapplication of bank moneys or credit pur-
suant to section 673.10
On appeal to the appellate division, first department, the
defendants argued 1) that intent to injure or defraud is a neces-
sary element of the offense of wilful misapplication; and 2) that
imposing penal sanctions for violations of civil regulations is un-
constitutional, since the civil provisions do not give fair notice
that their infraction constitutes a crime." The appellate division
affirmed the convictions, s relying on People v. Marcus,3 a prior
case, which held that fraudulent intent is not an element of the
crime of wilful misapplication. A strong dissent by Judge Kup-
ferman, however, decried the prosecution of defendants whom
he characterized as "scapegoats in this tangled affair.""
B. Legislative History
New York's misapplication statute was originally enacted in
1913' 5 to provide depositors of State chartered banks a degree of
protection commensurate with that afforded depositors of na-
tionally chartered banks.'" The federal misapplication statute,
governing national banks, 7 had been in effect since the passage
25% may be deposited with the approval of a majority vote of the directors, and up to
200% if, in addition to the directors' approval, the Superintendent of Banks approves
and the depositary bank is a New York bank. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 106 (McKinney
1971).
10. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d 193, 436 N.E.2d 1274, 451 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1982). One
defendant pleaded guilty, preserving the intent question on appeal. Id. at 193, 436
N.E.2d at 1274, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
11. People v. Kagan, 83 A.D.2d 517, 441 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Ist Dep't 1981).
12. Id. at 517, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
13. 261 N.Y. 268, 185 N.E. 97 (1933), discussed infra. at text accompanying notes
31-42.
14. People v. Kagan, 83 A.D.2d at 522, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (Kupferman, J.,
dissenting).
15. The statute was enacted as 1913 N.Y. Laws ch. 102. At the time of its ratifica-
tion it was designated former N.Y. PENAL LAwS § 305, repealed by. PENAL LAW 1965 §
500.95. In 1965, the statute was redesignated as § 673 of the BANKING LAw, 1965 N.Y.
Laws ch. 1031 § 18. To avoid confusion, the statute will hereinafter be referred to simply
as the misapplication statute.
16. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
17. The federal-state regulatory dichotomy is the result of the dual banking system
which exists in the United States. Banks which operate under federal charter are gov-
erned primarily by federal regulations whereas state chartered banks are subject to regu-
3
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of the National Bank Act in 1864.8 The Act made it a crime for
any bank officer or employee to wilfully misapply bank moneys
with the intention of injuring or defrauding the bank or any
other individual or association. " The Act failed, however, to de-
fine the term "wilful misapplication."
In response to this deficiency, the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Britton,s° construed wilful misapplication as a
"misapplication for the use, benefit, or gain of the party charged,
or of some company or person other than the [bank]."'" The
Court, in Evans v. United States,2" further elucidated its under-
standing of wilful misapplication, stating that intent to injure or
defraud is the "gravamen of the offense." ' s Thus, a distinction
was drawn between mere maladministration, for which civil pen-
alties might lie, and wilful misapplication, punishable by up to
ten years imprisonment.""
Due to the nature of the dual banking system, the federal
provisions were not enforceable against officers or employees of
State chartered banking institutions.25 Therefore, in 1913, at the
request of New York Governor Sulzer," the Superintendent of
Banks, George Van Tuyl, Jr., proposed legislation to bring New
York's banking laws "more in harmony with the reading of the
lations legislated by the states. For a general discussion of the dual banking system see
Willie, State Banking: A Study in Dual Regulation, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 733
(1966).
18. See 13 Stat. 116 § 55 (1864): "every president, director, cashier, teller, clerk, or
agent of any association, who shall embezzle, abstract, or wilfully misapply any of the
moneys, funds, or credits of the association. * . with intent. . . to injure or defraud the
association or any other company, body politic or corporate, or any individual person
...shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment not less than five nor more than ten years." Id. (codified as
amended in 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976)).
19. See id..
20. 107 U.S. 655 (1883).
21. Id. at 666.
22. 153 U.S. 584 (1894).
23. Id. at 594 ("[in fact, the gravamen of the offence [of wilful misapplication] con-
sists in the evil design with which the misaaplication is made, and a count which should
omit the words 'wilfully,' etc., and 'with intent to defraud,' would be clearly bad").
24. See supra note 18.
25. See supra note 17. See generally Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA.
L. REV. 565 (1966) (examining the enforcement and problems of the Federal Reserve
System and regulatory agencies); Golembe, Our Remarkable Banking System, 53 VA. L.
REV. 1091 (1967) (a further examination of the conflicts in the federal banking system).
26. See PUBLIC PAPERS OF WILLIAM SULZER, GOVERNOR 738 (1914).
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provisions of the National Banking Act.""7
When the legislature adopted New York's misapplication
statute, it retained the federal "wilfully misapplies" language,
but did not expressly include the federally required element of
fraudulent intent.2  Despite the omission of the fraudulent in-
tent language, Van Tuyl expressed his understanding that the
new statute was aimed at protecting "depositors who have been
wronged and defrauded by officers of institutions in which they
have had their confidence. 2 9 Van Tuyl's remarks to the Legisla-
ture subsequent to the statute's enactment do not indicate that
he perceived any difference between the crime contemplated by
the New York statute and that contemplated by the federal
model upon which it was patterned. He expressed his satisfac-
tion that "acts which would have been speedily and severely
punished under the National Banking Act" would no longer go
unpunished in New York. 0
27. 1912 SUP'T OF BANKS ANN. REP 21. "
28. See supra notes 1 & 18 (setting forth the State and federal statutes).
In interpreting the deletion of the phrase "with intent to injure or defraud," it
should be noted that in 1882 the New York Legislature demonstrated an apparent dis-
satisfaction with a criminal definition of the word "wilful" which omitted the element of
injurious or fraudulent intent. Compare former N.Y. PENAL CODE § 718 (1881) with 1882
N.Y. Laws, ch. 384, § 718 (in 1882 the legislature expunged the following definition from
the statutes of New York, after it had been on the books for less than a year: "Each of
the terms "willful" and "willfully" imports a purpose of willingness to commit the act or
omission to which it refers, and does not require any specific intent to violate law, to
injure another, or to acquire any advantage").
In 1948, Congress, too, deleted the phrase requiring fraudulent intent from the fed-
eral misapplication statute. This deletion was made, not to remove the well-established
requirement of fraudulent intent, but rather to avoid unnecessary verbiage. See S. REP.
No. 1620, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1948).
29. 1913 Sup'T OF BANKS ANN. REP. 33 (emphasis added). Van Tuyl reported that
[chapter 102 of the Laws of 1913 transfers to the law of this state one of the
most valuable provisions of the National Banking Act, with relation to crimes
against banking institutions committed by officers, directors, employees or agents
thereof.
In the various attempts which have been made to punish the officers of failed
institutions in New York City and Brooklyn, it was found impossible to convict
for acts which would have been speedily and severely punished under the National
Banking Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that Van Tuyl apparently understood the misapplication
statute to apply to crimes against banks. His report made no mention of civil infractions





In 1933, the seminal case interpreting New York's misappli-
cation statute, People v. Marcus,1 held that where funds have
been used for other than corporate purposes, fraudulent intent
is not required to convict for wilful misapplication. 2 In Marcus,
a misapplication occurred when the directors of the Municipal
Safe Deposit Company (Company), to which the misapplication
statute applied, used funds for purposes other than those of the
Company.83
The Marcus defendants were directors of both the Com-
pany and the Bank of United States, the latter being a totally
distinct enterprise.3 The bank, having made loans in excess of
the civil regulatory limit to several of its affiliates, faced the pos-
sibility of civil penalties.35 In order to reduce the amount of the
excessive loans, the defendants devised a scheme whereby they
would use their influence as directors of the Company to have it
engage in a transaction designed to benefit the bank. In order to
assist the bank and thereby advance their interests as its direc-
tors, the defendants acted in their separate capacity as directors
of the Company and arranged to have it purchase stock of the
affiliates to which the excessive loans had been made. 6 The pro-
ceeds of the sale were then used by the bank's affiliates to repay
money which the affiliates owed the bank.3 7 The stock purchase
was arranged, not to defraud the Company, but solely to help
bring the bank's excessive loans to the affiliates within the regu-
latory limit.38 Since the transaction served no legitimate busi-
ness interest of the Company, the defendants, as its directors,
were held to have misapplied its funds by using them for pur-
poses other than those of the Company.3 ' Thus, the Marcus de-
31. 261 N.Y. 268, 185 N.E. 97 (1933).
32. Id. at 279, 185 N.E. at 99.
33. Id. at 281, 185 N.E. at 99-100.
34. Id. at 284, 185 N.E. at 101.
35. Id. at 286-87, 185 N.E. at 101-02. Though not an issue in the criminal prosecu-
tion of the Marcus defendants, it should be noted that at the time of the stock purchase,
the bank's outstanding loans exceeded the permissible regulatory limits.
36. Id. at 287, 185 N.E. at 102.
37. Id. at 288, 185 N.E. at 102.
38. Id. at 289-90, 185 N.E. at 103.




fendants were convicted of criminal misapplication even though
they neither intended nor caused any injury by the prohibited
transaction.4"
The Marcus prosecution did not focus on the impropriety of
the concededly excessive loans which the bank had made to its
affiliates, but rather on the ultra vires nature of the stock
purchase made on behalf of the Company."1 The Marcus court,
therefore, never addressed the question of whether the infrac-
tion of civil lending regulations, by itself, amounts to criminal
misapplication. Instead, the court focused on the stock purchase
and considered it a direct criminal misapplication of funds.'
A year later, in People v. Berardini,4 a New York trial
court broadly construed the the word "misapply," and held, as a
matter of law, that if a loan exceeds the statutory limit, such
loan constitutes a criminal misapplication." In examining the
mens rea requirements of criminal misapplication, the Berardini
court, following Marcus, stated that "honest motives" are
irrelevant.4
5
D. People v. Kagan: The Appellate Decision
The appellate division in Kagan, following its understand-
ing of the prior cases, held that evil intent is not a prerequisite
to conviction under section 673 of the New York Banking Law.' 6
The majority found that the verdict of the trial court was "in
40. Id. A civil suit was subsequently brought against the Bank of United States'
directors for the civil infractions of the banking regulations. See Broderick v. Marcus,
152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1934). Moreover, Broderick announced
that "the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, based upon the National Bank-
ing Act and the duty of directors of national banks, are fully applicable in State
courts." Id. at 417, 272 N.Y.S. at 460 (emphasis added).
41. People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. at 276, 185 N.E. at 97-98.
42. For a discussion criticizing the result in Marcus as unduly harsh, see J. GooD-
BAR, MANAGING THE PEOPLE'S MONEY 130-35 (1935) (where New York's misapplication
statute was characterized as "sadly in need of revision"). But see Fitzsimons, Recent
Criminal Cases, 24 J. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 774 (1933) (calling for stiffer criminal
sentences to deter misconduct by bankers).
43. 150 Misc. 311, 269 N.Y.S. 381 (1934).
44. Id. at 314, 269 N.Y.S. at 384-5. In Berardini, the issue was whether a particular
advance constituted an excessive loan. The court ruled that this was a question for the
jury. Id. at 317-18, 269 N.Y.S. at 387-9.
45. Id. at 314, 269 N.Y.S. at 384.




accordance with the clear meaning of the statutory language,
that a [section 6731 violation occurs when bank officials know-
ingly apply bank money or credit in a manner explicitly prohib-
ited by statutory provisions. 4 7 Thus, for purposes of satisfying
section 673, the court equated the word "wilfully" with the word
"knowingly."
Although the question had never been put to the jury, the
majority concluded that the defendants had used ABT's assets
for "other than corporate purposes or proper and legitimate in-
vestment. 4 8 Despite its holding that an intention to benefit per-
sonally is not relevant to such a prosecution, the court indicated
that the motivation to accommodate ABT's new owners by liber-
ally extending credit sufficiently demonstrated that the defen-
dants acted out of concern for their own private interests.'
Judge Kupferman, dissenting, observed that the defendants
had all acted in good faith, relying on "long-standing banking
practices and policies." 0 All excessive transfers to other banks
were repaid the next business day; all alleged overdrafts were
repaid with interest; and no check purchased went uncollected. 1
For these reasons, and considering that none of the defendants
stood to gain in any way from the transactions, Judge Kupfer-
man concluded that there was insufficient evidence of criminal
intent to support the charges."'
The dissent also found that Marcus was readily distinguish-
able. Contrary to the majority's factual determination, the dis-
sent asserted that the defendants in Kagan, unlike those in
Marcus, did not act in their own self interest, nor for other than
corporate purposes. Therefore, according to the dissent, the
Marcus holding that fraudulent intent is not required for con-
viction should have been narrowly construed and confined to its
own particular set of facts."3 Judge Kupferman further noted
that the Kagan convictions were reversible on the basis of the
impermissible imposition of section 673's penal sanctions for the
47. Id. at 517, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 518, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
50. Id. at 520, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 519, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 521, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 261 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 521, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 260-261 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
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infraction of sections 103 and 106." He concluded that, since the
civil regulations give no warning of penal consequences, a person
of "ordinary intelligence" would not have the constitutionally
mandated "fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbid-
den by statute. '"
III. The Kagan Decision
The court of appeals reversed, adopting, in part, the reason-
ing of Judge Kupferman's dissent.5" In an opinion written by
Chief Judge Cooke,5 the court noted 1) that none of the regula-
tory provisions cited prescribe penal sanctions;5 8 2) that ABT
suffered no losses due to the questioned transactions; and 3)
that none of the defendants stood to benefit from the transac-
tions.5' The court, narrowly interpreting Marcus, concluded that
conviction for wilful misapplication does not necessarily require
an intent to injure or defraud, but does require something more
54. Id. at 520, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 259-60 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). For federal cases
failing to impose criminal sanctions for civil infractions, see United States v. Britton, 107
U.S. 655 (1882), quoted supra at text accompanying note 21; United States v. Christo,
614 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1980) (an insider overdrafting case, which held that use of funds
in a manner unauthorized or prohibiited by the federal banking statutes does not, with-
out more, constitute criminal misapplication). For a discussion supporting the result in
Christo, see Schwind, Sinister Hybrid-Civil Constraint and Criminal Liability-A
New Application and the Fifth Circuit's Response, 97 BANKING L. J. 645 (1980).
55. People v. Kagan, 83 A.D.2d at 520, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 260 (Kupferman, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)).
56. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d 193, 436 N.E.2d 1274, 451 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1982).
Since the case was decided on the basis of the factual differences between Kagan and
Marcus, the court failed to reach the constitutional due process issue raised in Kupfer-
man's dissent.
57. Chief Judge Cooke wrote the majority opinion, joined by Judges Gabrielli,
Wachtler, Fuchsberg, Jones and Meyer. Judge Jasen dissented without opinion. Id. at
199, 436 N.E.2d at 1275, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 673.
58. Though the court did not recite them, there are many civil provisions of the
Banking Law which make specific reference to civil penalties only. See, e.g., § 103(8)
(forfeiture of twice the amount of the violative loan); § 104(5) (monetary fine for failure
to comply with record-keeping procedures); § 107 (monetary assessment for failure to
maintain proper reserves); § 123 (monetary penalty for failure to file reports with the
Superintendent of Banks). See also N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 125, 130, 176, 255, 258, 320,
329, 352, 513, and 605 (McKinney 1971); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 131, 202 (McKinney
Supp. 1982).




than a mere knowing violation of a civil regulation."
Citing former Superintendent of Banks Van Tuyl's 1912 re-
port to the Legislature, the court recognized that section 673's
predecessor was introduced in an effort to harmonize New
York's banking laws with the Federal National Banking Act. 1
Rather than dwelling on the New York statute's omission of the
federal requirement of fraudulent intent, the court focused on
the transactional nature of the offense. The court, citing Brit-
tone6 and Marcus," held that wilful misapplication requires a
use for the benefit of some party or company other than the
bank." The court concluded that unless there is such a conver-
sion, the infraction of civil regulations does not amount to
misapplication."
More specifically, the court ruled that a criminal misappli-
cation requires "personal pecuniary interest" in the transaction.
Disagreeing with the appellate division, the court noted that
such "incidental bounty" as the gratitude of a well-served client
or bank owner will not justify criminal penalties.6 The court
reasoned that since the defendants acted "without any sugges-
tion of personal profit," there was simply no basis for the
indictments.'7
60. Id. at 202, 436 N.E.2d at 1277, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 675. In particular, the court
stated that:
The primary question to be decided is the meaning of "wilful misapplication"
- i.e., what is the nature of the mens rea, if any, that must be alleged and proven
in order to sustain a prosecution for violating section 673. The People urge that a
knowing violation of the Banking Law's civil regulations suffices to establish a
wilful misapplication. On the other hand, defendants argue that an actual intent
to injure or defraud a bank is necessary. While it is concluded the People too
broadly interpret section 673, the defendant's construction similarly is found to be
overly narrow.
Id. at 203, 436 N.E.2d at 1277, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
61. Id. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
62. United States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655 (1883). See supra notes 20-21 and accom-
panying text.
63. People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. 268, 185 N.E. 97 (1933). See supra notes 31-42 and
accompanying text.
64. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d at 203-04, 436 N.E.2d at 1278, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 675-
76.







In Kagan, the court of appeals reiterated the Marcus court's
holding that criminal misapplication occurs when a banking in-
stitution's funds are applied for other than corporate purposes.6 8
In specifying that non-corporate use is a transactional prerequi-
site to criminal misapplication," however, the Kagan decision
significantly limits section 673's applicability. The decision in
Kagan, therefore, signals a retreat from the expansive reading of
New York's misapplication statute evidenced in both Berardini,
where excessive lending was deemed criminal per se, 70 and in the
appellate division's decision in Kagan, which held that violating
civil regulations to accommodate ABT's new owners went far
enough beyond the realm of legitimate corporate purposes to
warrant conviction.
By focusing primarily on the transactional nature of the of-
fense of wilful misapplication, the Kagan court circumvented
the question of the precise meaning of the term "wilfully" as it
applies to the mens rea requirement of section 673. The appel-
late division, in affirming the conviction of the Kagan defen-
dants, reasoned from what it characterized as the "clear mean-
ing of the statute," that, for purposes of satisfying section 673,
the word "wilfully" is synonymous with the word "knowingly."'
68. People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. 268, 185 N.E. 97 (1933). See supra notes 31-42 and
accompanying text.
69. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d 193 at 204, 436 N.E.2d 1274 at 1278, 451 N.Y.S.2d
at 676.
70. People r. Berardini, 150 Misc. 311, 269 N.Y.S. 381 (1934). See supra notes 43-45
and accompanying text. Berardini's finding that excessive loans are criminal per se over-
looks not only the legislative history of the misapplication statute, (see supra notes 15-28
and accompanying text), but also the fact that in Marcus, concededly excessive loans
were not criminally prosecuted. People v. Marcus, 261 N.Y. 268, 185 N.E. 97 (1933). Nor
did the Marcus court, which took pains to demonstrate how a stock purchase could be
deemed a criminal offense, give even the slightest indication that the misapplication
charges could alternatively have been grounded in the excessive loans which precipitated
the scheme. See id. at 268, 135 N.E. at 97.
71. People v. Kagan, 83 A.D.2d 517, 517-18, 441 N.Y.S.2d 256, 257 (1st Dep't 1981).
72. Id. at 517, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 257. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. To
describe the meaning of the word "wilful" as "clear" is to overlook not only its character-
ization as a "largely undefined and frequently hazy adverbial term," (Note, The Pro-
posed Penal Law of New York: Culpability, 64 COLUM. L. Ray. 1469, 1481 (1964) (quot-
ing Prop. Penal Law § 45.05, comm'n staff note), but also the truth of the observation
that "wilful is a word of many meanings, its construction often being influenced by its




The court of appeals, however, rightfully rejected the appellate
division's conclusion that the knowing infraction of bank lend-
ing regulations amounts to criminal misapplication. 73 The legis-
lative history of section 673,"' coupled with the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Britton7 s and Evans,7 lends considerable
weight to the argument that New York's legislature understood
criminal misapplication to mean something more than the mere
knowing infraction of civil regulations, encompassed by non-
criminal maladministration. While the court of appeals' decision
in Kagan does not go so far as to require actual fraudulent in-
tent, it does require that there must be at least some material
non-corporate purpose involved before the infraction of civil reg-
ulations will be deemed criminal. In-this respect, the court's de-
cision tends decidedly toward conformity with the federal trans-
actional requirements of wilful misapplication.
Despite its recognition that the nature of the mens rea re-
quired for criminal misapplication was a central issue in the
case, the Kagan court did not delineate the exact level of intent
that is required. What the court did make clear, however, is
that, absent self-dealing or a conscious intent to defraud, a
banker who applies moneys for the benefit of his bank, even in
violation of civil regulations, cannot be convicted of criminal
misapplication."
In evaluating the result reached in Kagan, one must con-
sider that even honest bankers may fall prey to the intricacies of
"wilful" or "wilfully" which are listed in 45 Words and Phrases 275-372 (1970) tends to
reinforce the Screws court's conclusion.
Even the New York Court of Appeals has had occasion to read a requirement of evil
intent into the term "wilful." See, e.g., People v. Pickett, 19 N.Y.2d 170, 176, 225 N.E.2d
509, 511-12, 278 N.Y.S.2d 802, 804-05 (1967). There, the court, interpreting the phrase
"any wilful act designed to interfere with the proper administration of public assis-
tance," held that "the Legislature meant to provide penal sactions only for acts moti-
vated by fraudulent intent. Since the defendant was neither charged with fraud nor was
proof of fraud on his part introduced upon the trial, his conviction must be reversed." Id.
(emphasis added).
73. People v. Kagan, 56 N.Y.2d 193, 436 N.E.2d 1274, 451 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1982).
74. See supra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
75. United States v. Britton, 107 U.S. 655 (1883). See supra notes 20-21 and accom-
panying text.
76. Evans v. United States, 153 U.S. 584 (1894). See supra notes 22-24 and accom-
panying text.




banking regulations. In 1913, former Superintendent of Banks,
Van Tuyl, expressed a sympathetic understanding for those who
must operate within the regulatory challenges of New York's
banking laws, stating:
[T]he banking law today is full of incongruities and ambiguities.
In fact, the language used is in many instances both crude and
prolix. So many of its provisions are capable of different interpre-
tations that in order to know what the law with reference to any
particular subject is it is necessary to have a comprehensive
knowledge of the opinions of the Attorney General interpreting it
rather than to be familiar with the law itself.7
Given the apparent difficulty that the courts have had in inter-
preting section 673, Van Tuyl's remarks regarding banking regu-
lations retain a degree of validity even today. The Kagan deci-
sion at least diminishes the risk of criminal conviction for those
who endeavor to operate under such regulations.
The Kagan court, having reversed on other grounds, cor-
rectly declined to reach the constitutional fair notice question.
Yet section 673's lack of specificity as to the definition of wilful
misapplication may continue to prove troublesome, not only for
unwary bankers, but also for regulators attempting to deter
abuses. Though the boundaries marked off in Kagan will help to
minimize such potential difficulties, a more precise statutory
definition is desirable.
V. Conclusion
In narrowing the scope of conduct proscribed by section 673
to cases involving something more than the knowing infraction
of civil regulations, the Kagan decision harmonizes New York's
misapplication statute with its federal counterpart and reduces
the risk of unwarranted prosecutions of bankers doing business
in New York. The decision thereby alleviates some of the diffi-
culties created by the legislative failure to clearly define the
crime of wilful misapplication. Moreover, the Kagan decision
78. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1913, at 14, col. 4.
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raises the hope that, henceforth, section 673 will, itself, be less
susceptible to misapplication.
Donald M. Ferencz
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol3/iss1/9
